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Et tu (a)(2)? Blattmachr & Gans Dismantle Tax
Court’s Powell Analysis
N. Todd Angkatavanich, James I. Dougherty & Eric Fischer*
In their new article, Family Limited Partnerships and Section 2036:
Not Such a Good Fit, Jonathan Blattmachr and Mitchell Gans address
the resurrection of a troubling argument aimed at family partnerships.
For years, the IRS has argued that family partnerships it views as abusive are subject to challenge under Section 2036. In the recent Powell1
case, the IRS convinced the Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion, to take up
favorable dicta from Strangi2 and sanction its expanded use of this tool
by invalidating a family partnership under Section 2036(a)(2). The overarching theme of the article – that Section 2036 was never designed to
address family partnerships – is evident from the title and the authors
provide thorough and persuasive arguments as to why many believe the
positions embraced by the IRS and Tax Court in Strangi and Powell are
misguided. The article also offers important planning tips for practitioners — flawed though the Powell decision may be, the Tax Court’s view
of these issues must be taken into account in the planning process.
The rationale advanced by the Powell majority is difficult to reconcile with prior law, and Blattmachr and Gans offer little deference in
their critique. The relative weakness of the first half of the court’s analysis may be due to the fact that Mrs. Powell’s estate chose to concede to
the IRS’s aggressive arguments under Section 2036: first, that the mere
right of a limited partner to vote with respect to liquidation is a retained
string under Section 2036(a)(2); and second, that the bona fide sale exception to Section 2036 was inapplicable. The balance of its analysis,
which attempts to shoehorn failed family partnerships into Section 2043,
was raised sua sponte and not briefed by either party. In both aspects,
the Powell court was without the benefit of the vigorous development of
* N. Todd Angkatavanich is a Principal in the National Tax Department – Private
Client Services Practice of Ernst & Young LLP. James I. Dougherty is a Partner, and Eric
Fischer is an Associate in the Greenwich and New Haven, Connecticut offices of Withers
Bergman LLP. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the views of Ernst & Young LLP.
1 Estate of Powell v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 18, 2017 WL 2211398 (T.C. May 18,
2017).
2 Estate of Strangi v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003-145, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331
(2003), aff’d on other grounds, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005).
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legal and factual argument that is meant to be the bulwark of our adversarial system.
Although the Tax Court’s desire to produce an equitable result by
addressing a fact pattern that gestured strongly toward transfer tax manipulation is understandable, we believe the analysis advanced is ultimately incorrect and unworkable. Blattmachr and Gans neatly
summarize the near-universal consensus among commentators that
Powell’s bad facts made bad law, asserting that the Tax Court’s shortcoming is “the analytical methodology on which [the decision] is based,
not the outcome.”3 In other words, it is clear on the facts that Mrs. Powell’s estate deserved to lose, but the reasons advanced by the Tax Court
have the potential to create undeserved and inequitable losses in future
cases.
SECTION 2036

AND THE

ILLUSORY FIDUCIARY

Blattmachr and Gans rightly note that Section 2036 was not drafted
or designed for application to family partnerships. In particular, their
analysis of the Supreme Court’s holding on Section 2036(a)(2) in
Byrum4 stands in stark contrast to that of the Powell court. Blattmachr
and Gans offer an analysis that is straightforward, rational and easily
applied to family partnerships, including the partnership at issue in Powell. The Powell court, by contrast, struggles desperately to free itself
from the rule established in Byrum, a concerning choice in an area of
law that sees little oversight from the nation’s highest court.
At the heart of this divergence is Byrum’s conclusion that, to
prompt estate inclusion under Section 2036(a)(2), a decedent must retain a “legally enforceable right” to affect the beneficial enjoyment of
transferred property.5 If fiduciary duties restrain the exercise of a
power, Byrum reasons that the holder of the power is deprived of the
right to exercise it as he or she sees fit and, thus, the power is outside of
Section 2036(a)(2). Applied to family partnerships, it should be clear
that the mere existence of a voting right, if restricted by fiduciary duties,
should not result in estate inclusion under ordinary circumstances.
The Powell court attempts to break free of this rule – one our constitutional system tells us should bind lower courts – by simply disregarding the existence of fiduciary duties altogether. It does so on two
alternate grounds: first, that “intra-family fiduciary duties” are “illusory” and may be ignored; and second, that because Mrs. Powell’s son
3 Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Family Limited Partnerships and
Section 2036: Not Such a Good Fit, 42 ACTEC L.J. 253, 269 (2017).
4 United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
5 Id. at 136-37.
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was both the general partner of the family partnership and her attorneyin-fact, any relevant fiduciary duty was owed almost entirely to Mrs.
Powell and may likewise be ignored.
Blattmachr and Gans provide a thorough review of the authority
undermining these points, but could perhaps do more to emphasize the
fundamental shortcoming of the Tax Court’s rationale. There is no body
of federal law governing the fiduciary relationships at issue in Powell –
those owed by trustees to beneficiaries, those owed among partners in a
partnership, and those owed by agents to principals. Rather, such duties
are creatures of state law and their existence and character under state
law not only should be respected by federal courts, but is critical to the
administration of federal tax law. The Powell decision does not cite any
state law to support its two theories to disregard fiduciary duties, and we
have not found a single state case invalidating intra-family fiduciary duties as “illusory.” Indeed, Delaware courts (the jurisdiction of the Powell’s family partnership) have repeatedly held that fiduciary duties are
enforceable as between majority and minority owners of an entity, and
make no distinction based on family ownership.6
Unless the Powell court undertook an analysis of state law not cited
in its opinion, the fiduciary duties owed by the trustee, general partner
and attorney-in-fact in Powell should be within the scope of Byrum and
thus should not result in estate inclusion under Section 2036(a)(2). As in
Strangi, the Tax Court’s attempt to create a new federal law of fiduciary
duties was an unforced error that was unnecessary to reach its desired
result. The Powell court would have been better off relying on its core
holding – the transfer of Mrs. Powell’s partnership interest under a
power of attorney was ineffective under state law, and the value of the
interest was thus subject to estate tax under Section 2038(a).
A PROBLEMATIC LACUNA
While the Section 2036 issue has generated discussion and debate
amongst practitioners, it was actually not the issue that led to the Tax
Court’s divided opinion – instead, it was a disagreement over the applicability of Section 2043. To summarize, Section 2036 is an anti-abuse
provision and not intended to be punitive. When applied to partnerships, however, Section 2036 could potentially result in double taxation
by taxing the value of the partnership interest (under Section 2033) and
the value of the underlying assets (under Section 2036). This issue was
easily addressed in earlier cases involving family partnerships by includ6 See, e.g., Weinstein Enters. v. Orloff, 980 A.2d 499 (Del. 2005) (noting that fiduciary duties are no less salient when owed to minority owners and “do not run directly” to
majority owners). See also, Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050 (Del. Ch. 1984) (noting
that controlling ownership can give rise to concomitant fiduciary status).
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ing the date of death value of the underlying assets and simply disregarding the partnership interest, the value of which is derived from
those very same assets.
However, the Powell majority raised the question of what authority
prevented double taxation, stating that it had gone “unarticulated” and
that the case “provide[d] us the opportunity to fill that lacuna and explain why a double inclusion in a decedent’s estate is not only illogical, it
is not allowed.”7 The position set forth by the majority was that double
inclusion was avoided by including in the gross estate (1) the value of
the partnership interest, and (2) the value of the underlying assets less
the consideration received in return for the assets at the time of contribution (i.e. the partnership interest) under Section 2043.
This gratuitous pronouncement was wrong on two fundamental
levels: first, the Tax Court addressed this issue in previous cases, including Strangi, which the Powell decision so heavily relied on in its Section
2036 analysis; and second, Powell did not provide an opportunity to address the issue. The word “opportunity” refers to a situation where circumstances allow for a desired outcome. In Powell, neither the IRS nor
the taxpayer raised this issue, meaning it was not properly briefed or
argued. As such, the circumstances necessary for a meaningful discussion and decision on the issue were not present. Because there was no
argument on the issue, any discussion by the court is mere dicta. This
sentiment was well articulated in the Powell concurrence.
Blattmachr and Gans also address this issue by presenting it as another example of how applying Section 2036 to partnerships is like putting a square peg into a round hole. Their explanation of the majority’s
position and how it is problematic in practice is clearly demonstrated
through the use of examples. From the examples, readers will be able to
see for themselves the similarity of the majority’s Section 2036 and 2043
analyses — correct results reached for the wrong reasons which, if applied in other cases, could produce incorrect results. Ultimately,
Blattmachr and Gans conclude that the opinion of the concurrence,
under which the value of the partnership interest is disregarded and the
underlying assets are included under Section 2036, is likely the preferable approach as it would consistently achieve the objective of preventing
abusive transfers without punitive double taxation.
Although we agree with Blattmachr and Gans that the majority’s
opinion is unworkable from a policy perspective, we also contend that
its approach is simply incorrect. The technical underpinnings of the
Powell majority’s Section 2043 position deserve as much (if not more)
7 Estate of Powell v. Comm’r, 148 T.C. No. 18, 2017 WL 2211398, at *9 (T.C. May
18, 2017).
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scrutiny than the Section 2036 issue. In our previous review of the Powell decision, we set forth our arguments as to why the majority’s opinion
is incorrect.8 The majority’s analytical approach is not based on policy
preferences, but is instead predicated on the inaccurate assumption that
no approach based in the Code and case law had been previously articulated. In reviewing the Powell decision, we believe it is necessary to
grapple with the majority’s assertion that its new position was needed
and/or correct.
LESSONS

FOR

PRACTITIONERS

As noted above, in their article, Blattmachr and Gans offer real
world insight for practitioners working with family partnerships in the
post-Powell world. We agree with Blattmachr and Gans that the Powell
decision is fundamentally flawed on many levels, and that a different
result might have come about had Mrs. Powell’s estate fully briefed and
argued the legal points advanced by the IRS and endorsed by the Tax
Court. However, practitioners should not take this criticism as gospel
and simply ignore the Tax Court’s stated position.
Blattmachr and Gans offer practical advice that can be used by
practitioners to “neutralize” the arguments raised in Powell in the estate
planning phase. The Tax Court’s willingness in Powell to invoke Section
2036(a)(2) where a decedent owns only a limited partnership interest
should counsel practitioners to carefully restrict the rights granted to
senior generation family members in new family partnerships and to
perhaps revisit and pursue decontrolling techniques for existing family
partnerships.
As important as these points are in crafting wealth transfer structures, we also believe Powell offers an important lesson for estate administration. Powell is a case in point of why an estate should not simply
concede potential arguments against estate tax inclusion.9 When defending against Section 2036 attacks by the IRS, practitioners should be prepared to contest the inapplicability of the provision, even if it is an
alternate argument to the estate’s primary argument.

8 See N. Todd Angkatavanich, James I. Dougherty & Eric Fischer, Stranger than
Strangi and Partially Fiction, 156 TR. & EST. 9 (Sept. 2017).
9 Stephanie Loomis-Price, Family Limited Partnerships—Update, Presentation to
the ABA Sec. of Tax’n and Sec. of Real Prop. (2017).

